Friday, 11 September 2015


PLEA OF PART PERFORMANCE-WHETHER LAW OF LIMITATION APPLY
The Doctrine of part performance was added to statute book by the Transfer of property (Amendment) Act 1929. The Doctrine of part performance which was enacted in England was partially imported into India and with the aid of the doctrine, a defendant in an action of ejectment may, in certain circumstances effectively plead possession under an unregistered contract of sale in defence to the action. Before the amendment, the doctrine was considered by the Indian courts as a principle of equity.

After amendment of the Act, Sec.53-A is formed as a statutory defence to a person who has an unregistered sale deed in his favour to maintain his possession, if he can prove a written and signed contract in his favour and performance of some action on his part in part performance of that contract. The privy council held that the right conferred U/Sec.53-A of T.P.Act is a right available for the defendant, to protect his possession and the provision is framed to impose a statutory bar on the transferor, but does not confer any active title on the transferee. In Maniklal Mansukhbai Vs. H.J.Ginwalla & Sons(1) the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the previous decisions of Privy council in Peer Baksh Vs.Mohamed Tahar and Prabodh Kumar Das Vs. Dantmara Tea Company Ltd held that Sec.53-A of T.P. Act furnishes a statutory defence to a person who has no registered title deed in his favour to maintain his possession, if he can prove a written and signed contract in his favour and some action on his part in part performance of that contract.

The said principle was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Technicians Studio Private Ltd Vs. Lila Ghosh(2) and in Patel Natwarlal Rupji Vs Shri Kondh Group Kheti Vishayak (3) where in it was held that Sec.53-A gives a statutory right to a transferee for consideration in possession of the property under a contract to defend his possession and it also correspondingly imposes a bar on the transferor to recover the possession of the immovable property from the said transferee. It was also held that Sec.53-A confers no title on the transferee in possession and he cannot maintain a suit on title. Therefore, Sec.53-A gives a shelter to a transferee who has performed substantial portion of the contract and where he has ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Thus Sec.53-A acts as a shield but not as a sword. Since, the provisions of Sec.53-A are equitable in nature the transferee must perform his part of the contract and then only he is entitled to claim the benefit of the provision. This is based on classic maxim that “who seeks equity must do equity”. In view of the above law Sec.53-A though, confers no title on the transferee and he cannot maintain a suit on title, but it imposes a bar on the transferor to seek for the recovery of the possession.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court enunciated the principles and conditions to invoke Sec.53-A in cases of ejectment suits in the land mark decision between Nathulal Vs. Phoolchand (4). In S.S.Surya Vamsi Vs.P.B.Surya Vamsi (5) the Hon’ble apex court reiterated the said conditions as follows
  1. there must be a contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property;
  2. the contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf;
  3. the writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained;
  4. the transferee must in part performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof;
  5. the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and
  6. the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.
In Ramgopal Reddy Vs The Addl. Custodian, Evacuee property (6) the constitutional bench of the Hon’ble apex court held that Sec.53-A can’t be taken aid of by the plaintiff to establish his right as owner of the property. Hence, it operates as a shield but not as a sword or independent claim to a person in either capacity. In view of the above law, it is clear that so long as the transferor has done and is willing to perform his part of contract, or is always ready and willing to abide by the terms of the contract, the transferee is entitled to avail of this statutory right to protect his possession as a shield but not as a sword and it operates as a bar to the transferee to assert his title.

Effect of law of limitation:
In the light of above law, it has to be seen that once remedy by way of suit for specific performance of a contract for sale in respect of immovable property becomes barred by limitation by the provisions of Limitation Act, then even statutory right provided under Sec.53-A of T.P.Act to defend the possession over the property taken or continued under the said contract has lost, destroyed or extinguished and whether the transferee can avail the defence of Sec.53-A in any subsequent suit filed by the transferor against him.

         Very often it is the question before the Indian Courts that whether the law of limitation defeats the protection available under sec.53-A of T.P.Act. In most of the ejectment suits the dispute arises when a defendant fails to bring a suit for specific performance within the prescribed period as provided under Article 54 of Limitation Act 1963. It was held in some decisions that a person who fails to bring a suit for specific performance within limitation cannot be given the protection of Sec.53-A. Various High Courts expressed divergent opinions basing on two rival principles i.e. (1) Delay defeats equity. (2) No defence suffers from limitation.

           Sec.2(J) Contract Act:- A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when ceases to be enforceable.

          Article 54 of Limitation Act provides a prescribed period of three years to sue for the specific performance of a contract for sale which runs from the date when the specific performance of the contract is denied.

        The general principle is that law of limitation does not affect a defence. The law of limitation does not provide any prescribed period on expiry of which the defence under Sec.53-A will be extinguished. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the limitation bars the remedy, but not the right. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of part performance is a doctrine of equity. Some of the courts refused to act upon Sec.53-A basing on the principle of equity that delay defeats equity. It was held that when the contract of sale becomes un-enforceable by reason of limitation, the defence of part performance which is found on such agreement can’t be permitted to be enforced and the protection of Sec.53-A cannot be given as the contract has lost all its efficacy as the right to enforce the contract is lost by law of limitation.

           A view is also taken that the transferee who is seeking the protection of Sec.53-A must possess a right to enforce under the agreement and when such right is lost, the protection is also lost.

The protection of Sec.53-A is available to the transferee as long as he has done and is willing to perform his part of the contract or, in other words he is always ready and willing to satisfy the terms of the contract and to perform his part of the contract. The transferee is entitled to avail the benefit to protect his possession as a shield but not as a sword. Though, the doctrine does not create any active title in the transferee, it operates as a bar on the transferor to assert his title. Therefore, it imposes a bar on the transferor to enforce his rights against the transferee. By various pronouncements, the Hon’ble Supreme Court settled the law in this regard that the right of a transferee to defend his possession on fulfilling the statutory conditions contained in the provision cannot be whistled down on the equitable concept of latches or limitation.

             Even a statutory remedy is extinguished by the operation of law of limitation the right subsists. This rule was firstly laid by the Privy Council in Mahanth Singh Vs.U Ba Yi (7). In Punjab National Bank Vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha (8) it was held that Sec.3 of Limitation Act bars the remedy, but not destroys the right of a party.

          So, when the right to bring the suit for specific performance is lost by virtue of limitation, the transferee can assert his contract as it remains valid and operative entitling him to exert his right to retain possession over the property. Law of limitation does not apply to a defence under Sec.53-A since the section does not provide any prescribed period on expiry whereof the defence will be lost or will extinguish.

The Hon’ble Apex Court resolved the issue as to the applicability of limitation to the defence under Sec.53-A in the land mark decision between S.S.Surya Vamsi Vs.P.B.Surya Vamsi (5). The Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the principles and conditions which are required to be fulfilled by a transferee to defend or protect his possession under Sec.53-A of the Act.

     The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that Sec.53-A does not permit the defendant/transferee from taking plea in his defence to protect his possession over the land obtained in part performance of the contract even though, the period of limitation to bring a suit for specific performance has expired. It was also held that Sec.53-A is not creating any embargo on the transferee to protect his possession in respect of the purchased property taken in part performance of the contract, if the period of limitation to bring a suit for specific performance is expired. The Hon’ble Apex Court while settling the law, considered the legislative history while incorporating Sec.53-A into statute book.

In the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex further held as follows:” It is, therefore, manifest that the Limitation Act does not extinguish a defence, but only bars the remedy. Since the period of limitation bars a suit for specific performance of a contract, if brought after the period of limitation, it is open to a defendant in a suit for recovery of possession brought by a transferor to take a plea in defence of part performance of the contract to protect his possession, though he may not able to enforce that right through a suit or action.
In the same decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the law of limitation is not applicable to a plea taken in defence unless, expressly the provision is made in the statute. It was held that the law of limitation applies to the suits and applications, but not to the defences available to a person in a suit. Thus the law of limitation bars only the action in a court of law, but it does not restricts the defendant to put forth any defence though such defence is barred by limitation in the shape of a claim.

CASE LAW
1. AIR 1950 SC 1
2. AIR 1977 SC 2425
3. AIR 1996 SC 1088
4. AIR 1970 SC 546
5. AIR 2002 SC 960
6. AIR 1966 SC 1438(CB)
7. AIR 1939 PC 110

8. AIR 1992 SC 1815

Effect of Repealing Acts on Amendments to Cr.P.C

Effect Of Repealing Act On The Provisions Of Principal Act
The Parliament has enacted The Repealing and Amending Act, 2015 (Act No. 17/2015) and The Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2015 (Act No. 19/2015) with effect from 13-5-2015 and 14-5-2015 respectively. Under both these Repealing Acts, several central enactments were repealed in whole. The prominent enactments which were repealed under the above Acts include the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002, Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008, Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2010, the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 etc., The Central Government has requested the Law Commission of India to make recommendations to repeal the obsolete laws which are no more required. Accordingly, the Law Commission of India in its report Nos. 250 and 251 has made recommendations to repeal certain laws which are no more useful. The main object to repeal the Acts is to avoid confusion in the minds of public at large as well as to understand the legislations easy.

2. Since last few days, an interesting argument is canvassed by the learned members at Bar that the amendments which were made to Code of Criminal Procedure under the Amendment Acts passed in the years 2008, 2010 stands repealed under the new Repealing Acts and thus it is not necessary to follow the provisions which were brought certain changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure such as Section 41-A Cr.P.C etc., It is advocated that in view of the Repealing Acts, the said amendments brought to the principal code stands repealed and deleted.

3. This said argument of the learned members of the bar cannot be countenanced for the reason that as per the Savings Clause in Section 4 of both Act Nos. 17/15 and 19/15, the changes which were brought to the Principal Act by virtue of the amended provisions are saved. Further more, as per Section 6(A) of General Clauses Act, 1897 what ever the Repeals brought under a Repealing Act would not have any impact on the Principal Act which was amended by virtue of any Amendment brought to the Principal Act.

4. Section 6(A) of General Clauses Act, 1897 reads thus:
6A: Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation: Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.

5. Section 4 of both the Repealing and Amendment Acts (17 and 19 of 2015) reads as under:
The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any Act in which such enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to;”

6. In Khuda Bux Vs. Manager, Caledonian Press, 1954 Law Suit(Cal) 60 (DB) Chakravarti C.J., explained as under:
"Such Acts have no legislative effect, but are designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from the statute book and to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their existence. At times, inconsistencies are also removed by repealing and amending Acts. The only objects of such Acts which in England are called Statute Law Revision Acts, is legislative spring-clearing and they are not intended to make any change in the law. Even so, they are guarded by saving clauses drawn with elaborate care".

7. Now it is to be seen as to what would be the legal position of the amendment made in the Principal Act by the Amending Act which was subsequently repealed.

8. As per Maxwell and Halsburys Laws of England, such Repealing and Amending Acts strike out enactments which have become unnecessary. Having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, they have achieved their object. They have thereafter no reason for their existence. It is thus a legislative "spring-cleaning" to strike out "excise dead matter from the statute book in order to lighten the burden of ever increasing spate of legislation and to remove confusion from the public mind".

9. The observations of the High Court of Calcutta in Khuda Bux were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Jethanand Betab Vs. State of Delhi {1959 LawSuit(SC) 161}. The ratio laid down in Jethanand Betab directly covers these sort of cases. Thus, it is clear that once an amendment was made to Code of Criminal Procedure by the Amendment Acts of 2008 and 2010 and it had been brought into force, it has served its purpose and amended the Original Act. Its object was to implant necessary amendment in the Principal Act. Once such planting has been effected, the Amending Act having achieved its object, lost its efficacy. It was thereafter not necessary to continue the Amending Act in the statute book. Once the implant is fixed in the Principal Act, then a step is required to be taken by the legislature. If no action is taken, innumerable such Amending Acts continue to remain in statute books. A Special Purpose device is, therefore, used by the Legislature to repeal such Amending Acts, which would repeal only those Amending Acts. But such repeal does not affect Principal Acts which already stood amended.

10. Further, Section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Acts saves the operation of the amendments inserted in the Principal Act by the Acts Repealed. The amendments are clearly covered by the saving clause under Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act. Thus, on considering Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Acts, it is clear that the amendment in the Principal Act remains in operation and does not get abrogated. As the Amending Act has already been enacted and implemented by making necessary amendment and insertion in Principal Act, the Amending Act has lost its utility as its purpose has already been served. Hence, the above Amendment Acts are repealed as a whole.

11. In the light of these provisions, it can be safely said that by repealing any Act under which certain amendments are made to the Principal Act, there would be no impact on the provisions of the Principal Act in which the amendments are already carried out. Therefore, there is no change occurred to any of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973 which were amended in the years 2008 and 2010 and the effect of Repealing Act on such amendments is nothing.

12. Therefore, the contention of the learned Advocates that the amendments which were made to Code of Criminal Procedure under the Amendment Acts passed in 2008, 2010 stands repealed under the new Repealing Acts cannot be upheld. The amendment made in the Principal Act of 1973 by the Amending Acts of 2008, 2010 remains in force and repeal of Amending Acts in 2015 has not affected the Amendments made in 2008 and 2010 to the Principal Act.

@@@@@